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JONATHAN A. LESSER*

Resale of the Columbia River
Treaty Downstream Power
Benefits: One Road from Here to
There
ABSTRACT
Joint Canada-UnitedStates development of the Columbia River System
was made possible by the Columbia River Treaty. To finance the construction of the storage projects it would be required to build, Canada
sold its shareof the additionalhydroelectricpower benefits made possible
by the Treaty to the United States. That power will be completely repatriated to Canada by 2003. Unless a new sale is arranged, the Pacific
Northwest may have to replace as much as 600 average megawatts of
energy, and 1,400 megawatts of capacity. The issues associatedwith any
potential resale, however, will be complex. This paper presents estimates
of the value of the Canadianshare of energy from the perspective of the
Pacific Northwest, and discusses policy issues that eventually will have
to be addressed by both countries.
INTRODUCTION
In 1964, Canada sold its share of the power provided by the Columbia
River Treaty to the United States. That power, called the Canadian Entitlement, has been used by Northwest utilities to help meet a steadily
increasing demand for electricity. In 1998, however, the Canadian Entitlement begins to revert back to Canada. The Columbia River Treaty'
is a complex document. Many different aspects of the Pacific Northwest's
power system, such as the operation of hydroelectric sites and sales
arrangements between individual utilities and the Bonneville Power
Administration (BPA), are linked to the treaty. Debate on both sides of
the border has already begun as to whether the Canadian Entitlement will
be resold to the United States.2
*Economist and Energy Policy Specialist, the Washington State Energy Office. 1 am indebted to
Neil Swainson and Philip Wandhneider for their valuable comments on a previous version of this
paper. Remaining errors ae, of course, solely my responsibility.
I. Treaty between the United States and Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the
Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin, January 17, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 1555. T.I.A.S. No.
5638 thereinafter Treatyl. Reprinted in Bonneville Power Administration. Columbia River Treaty
Documents 2 (1979) (hereinafter Bonneville Power Administration).
2. Swainson. The Columbia River Treaty: Where Do We Go from Here?, 26 Nat. Res. J. 243
(1986).
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Many operational aspects of the treaty, such as the amount of water
that can be diverted from the Kootenai River' and the operation of the
system of storage reservoirs, have had the potential for creating disputes
between the United States and Cinada. But, in addition to these potential
disputes, there are other contentious issues associated with the treaty not
envisioned when it was ratified in 1964. These issues include treatment
of requirements for fish and wildlife mitigation in the Pacific Northwest,
the expiration of the agreement that coordinates hydropower operations
in the Northwest, and renegotiation of the downstream power benefits
made possible by the treaty. ACanadian-United States conflict over these
issues could exist due to the complexity of the treaty itself and to the
relationship of the treaty to other existing laws and agreements that affect
management of the Columbia River System and generation of electric
power in the Pacific Northwest." Since ratification of the treaty, the Pacific
Northwest regional calculus, especially with regard to power generation
and the importance of environmental factors, has changed considerably.
This article focuses on the value of a resale of the Entitlement to the
Pacific Northwest, and the surrounding issues that will complicate any
such sale. First, a brief history and review of the treaty is presented.
Next, the calculations of the Canadian Entitlement are described, along
with the characteristics of the Northwest's power system that influence
its magnitude. Then, a Monte-Carlo model is used to estimate values of
the Entitlement under alternative contractual assumptions. Finally, policy
issues that will impact a potential resale of the Entitlement to the Pacific
Northwest are discussed.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY

In 1944, recognizing the potential for significant power and flood control benefits, the governments of the United States and Canada began to
assess the value of cooperative development of.the Columbia River system. The task was assigned to the International Joint Commission (IJC),
which was established in 1909 after ratification of the Boundary Waters
Treaty.' The UC was designed to "resolve and, as far as possible, to
forestall, disputes with respect to water use and to deal with other matters
of mutual concern ...

along the 4,000 miles of common border." 6

In 1959, the International Columbia River Engineering Board, which
had been established by the IJC to assess the potential for cooperative
3. In Canada. spelled Kootenay.
4. See P. Wandschneider. Management of a United States-Canada Common Resource: The Columbia River (1983); see also N. Swainson, Conflict over the Columbia: The Canadian Background
to an Historic Treaty (1979).
5. Treaty between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters. January 11,
1909, 36 Stat. 2448. T.S. No. 548.
6. Id. at 19.
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development, submitted its findings. The Engineering Board found that
significant benefits from joint development of hydro storage facilities on
the Columbia River did exist.7 Anticipating this conclusion, both the
United States and Canada asked the UC to recommend principles that
would determine the benefits that would result from the joint operation
of those hydro storage facilities and, more importantly, the apportionment
of those benefits between the two countries. Within the next year, the
IJCdeveloped two sets of principles that would be used to determine the
aggregate benefits from cooperative development, and to guide their apportionment. 8 These principles covered both general and power-related
issues.
The recommendations of the Engineering Board, the guidance provided
by the IC principles, and complex bargaining between the United States,
Canada, and British Columbia shaped the final language in the treaty.9
After considerable negotiations, Canada agreed to construct three storage
projects totalling 15.5 million acre-feet (maf) of hydro storage. The Canadian projects were located on the Columbia River near Mica Creek,
providing seven maf of storage, near the outlet of Arrow Lakes, providing
slightly more than seven maf of storage, and on the Duncan River, providing about one and one-half maf of storage.'" In addition, the Treaty
gave the United States the option of constructing a transboundary facility
on the Kootenai River near Libby, Montana." The United States exercised
that option, and completed Libby Dam in August 1975.'2
These four projects provided greater control of water flows in the
Columbia River System, and reduced the likelihood of severe flood damage in the United States. Equally important, however, hydroelectric generating facilities located in the Pacific Northwest have been able to convert
potential non-firm generation to more valuable firm generation." Thus,
the value of the Canadian storage has been its ability to retain water and
7. J.Krutilla, The Columbia River Treaty: The Economics of an International River Basin 6998 (1967).
8. Canada Departments of External Affairs and Northern Affairs and National Resources. The
Columbia River Treaty, Protocol, and Related Documents 39-55 (February 1964) [hereinafter Protocoll.
9. J.Krutilla, supra nowe 7, at 99-113. P. Wandschneider, supra note 4, at'8.
termed the negotiations as double.bilateral: Canada-British Columbia. Canada-United States.
10. Bonneville Power Administration, supra note I,at 4. Subsequently. storage at Mica has been
increased to about 12 maf. However. this additional storage has no impact on the determination of
downstream power benefits. Unlike Duncan and Arrow. Mica also has a generating capacity of over
1,700 MW. This generating capacity also has no impact on the determination of Treaty downstream

benefits.
It. Id. at9.
12. iUbby dam also produces power, with a generating capacity of 525 megawatts.
13. The precise definition of firm hydroelectric energy can vary. depending on the planning body.
As an intuitive definition, firm hydroelectric energy may be thought of as energy which can be
guaranteed to be available on a long-term basis, irrespective of water conditions. Non.firm energy.
on the other hand, will vary depending on water conditions, and may therefore be available only
intermittently.
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release it in later months or years, and thereby increase the amount of
energy that can be generated under worst case streamflows.' 4
In exchange for the additional water storage it provided upstream,
Canada was to receive one-half of the additional power that would be
produced at downstream United States hydroelectric generating plants.
This additional power is referred to as the downstream -power benefits."5
The Canadian share of those benefits is referred to as the Canadian Entitlement. The treaty, as modified in 1964 by a protocol and an attachment
relating to terms of sale, also stipulated that Canada would receive a
lump sum payment intended to represent one-half the expected value of
future flood damage reduction in the Columbia River flood plain for the
60 years that the treaty would remain in force.
While the treaty was signed in 1961, it was not ratified until 1964,
primarily because of negotiation over the actual calculation of the downstream power benefits, internal Canadian debate over the desirability of
selling the Canadian Entitlement to the United States, and disagreement
over the simultaneous development of the Peace River system in British
Columbia." The sale of the Canadian Entitlement, however, was made
imperative by the potential inability of British Columbia to independently
finance the three Canadian storage projects and the province's decision
in 1961 to proceed at once with a major Peace River project.
The actual sale was arranged between two entities that were created
in conjunction with the sale. The Canadian entity, British Columbia Hydro
and Power Authority (B.C. Hydro)-a 1962 fusion of the then publicly
owned B.C. Electric Company and of the B.C. Power Commission14. In the Pacific Northwest. firm hydroelectric energy is specifically defined by fim energy load
carrying capability (FELCC). FELCC is the amount of energy available under the worst case (called
.critical") water conditions over a 50 year history of streamflows. Depending on the load shape
and the portfolio of available resources, the critical period can either be a two year period between
1943-45. a three year period between 1929-32, a 42 month period between 1928-32. or a 6 month
period between 1936-37. By definition, the critical period is the one which produces the lowest
FELCC.
15. The term "power" is used to encompass both peaking capacity (megawatts available instantaneously) and energy (megawatts of energy delivered over a specified period of time). As an example,
a 100 watt light bulb burning 10 hours uses one kilowatt of electricity.
16. P. Wandschneider. supra note 4, at 8-9. A selected chronology of articles arguing the relative
merits of the joint development of the Columbia River system in general and the Columbia River
Treaty in particular includes: Cohen, Some Legal and Policy Aspects of the Columbia River Dispute.
36 Can. B. Rev. 25 (1958); Boume, The Columbia River Controversy, 37 Can. B. Rev. 444 (1959);
Johnson. Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable Apportionment of InternationalRivers I: An
American View, I U.B.C. L. Rev. 389 (1960); Goldie, Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable
Apportionment of International Rivers I: A Canadian View, I U.B.C. L. Rev. 399 (1960). Higgins,
Columbia River Treaty: A Critical Viesv 16 Int'l J. 397(1961). McNaughton, The Proposed Columbia
River Treaty. 18 Int'l. J. 148 (1963). Utton, The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol. I Land &
Water L. Rev. 181 (1966); and Johnson, The Canada-United States Controversy over the Columbia
River, 41 Wash. L. Rev, 676 (1966). 1. Krutilla, supra note 7, provides a thorough analysis of the
Columbia River Treaty, and the politics that led to the development of projects that he concluded
were not optimal from an economic standpoint.
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was named as Canada's treaty entity in the July 1963 Canada-B.C. Agreement, and in the January 1964 Canada-U.S. Agreement on terms of sale.' 7
To facilitate sale of the Canadian Entitlement, a non-profit United States
entity, the Columbia Storage Power Exchange (CSPE), was also formed.
The primary purpose of CSPE was to execute the contract for purchase
of the Canadian Entitlement, issue the necessary bonds to finance the

projects, and then receive and resell the power benefits.'" To purchase
the Canadian Entitlement, CSPE issued what was then the fourth largest
bond sale in United States history. 9 CSPE allocated the power to the 41
participating utilities through tripartite exchange agreements with the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) to reduce the risk that the value
of the Entitlement would be insufficient to cover the cost of the bonds. .'
Under those agreements, CSPE assigned a portion of the Canadian Entitlement to each participant for the 30 years following each Canadian
project's completion. Those participants, in turn, assigned BPA their
rights to the Entitlement in exchange for firm power from BPA, which
BPA guaranteed to deliver even if Canada failed to operate the projects
as specified in the treaty." The sale, called the Canadian Entitlement
17. Reprinted in Protocol, supra note 8. at 100-09 and 117.20. respectively. The history behind
the agreements. and the formation of B.C. Hydro is rather interesting. British Columbia had been
interested in development of the Peace River, in the northern interior of the province to enhance
economic growth in the province. As the negotiations that ultimately led to the aforementioned
agreements proceeded, the province went ahead with its plans to develop the Peace River.
The British Columbia Engineering Board (BCEB) was asked to study the circumstances under
which development of both the Peace and Columbia River systems would be complementary. The
Board found that the costs of power from either would be approximately equal. Thus, a choice
between Columbia River and Peace River development could not be based on power costs. Since
development of both would provide too much power for'British Columbia, an export market had to
be identified. The Pacific Northwest was the obvious choice. The Columbia River development
would be able to deliver the power without the need for construction of transmission facilities, since
the power Would be produced at downstream plants in the United States.
It was after this report from the BCEB that the province took over the private electric companies.
The province would be able to finance the projects at a lower interest rate, and would have control
of the major power markets. In the end, however, the Peace River was not fully developed. Today,
only two sites on the river have been completed. The Peace River Dam (now called W.A.C. Bennett
Dam), which was under construction at the time the treaty was ratified, was completed in 1968.
Peace Canyon Dam was completed in 1980, and B.C. Hydro plans to build Site C around the turn
of the century. See B.C. Hydro, Twenty Year Resource Plan 31 (1989).
18. Swainson. supra note 2, at 247,
19. The total amount of the bond sale was $314 million (U.S.). This figure includes interest
during construction. See J. Krutilla, supra note 7, at 166.
20. The agreements between BPA, CSPE, and the individual CSPE members were called the
Canadian Entitlement Exchange Agreements. (Copies of these agreements are available from BPA.)
Exhibit A of these agreements contains the list of participants and their percentage shares of the
Entitlement.
21. In separate allocation agreements, BPA also promised to sell additional capacity to the utilities
operating the five non-federal hydro projects on the Columbia River whose firm generation would
be affected by the treaty. See e.g., Canadian Entitlement Allocation Agreement executed by the
United States of America Acting by and through the Bonneville Power Administrator and Public
Utility District No. 2 of Grant County, Washington (August 13, 1964).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[V&o30

Purchase Agreement, 2 was executed on August 13, 1964 for a period of
30 years after the completion of each Canadian storage project. The sale
price was $254.4 million 1964 United States dollars (as of October 1),
payable over eight annual installments.'
Under the agreement with BPA, the calculated Canadian Entitlement
can exceed (or be less than) the agreed upon level of firm power that
BPA delivers to the CSPE participants. For example, in 1975-76, CSPE
participants received 739 average megawatts (MWa) from BPA, while
the downstream benefits had been previously determined to be only 668
MWa. In later years, the calculated benefits have exceeded deliveries of
energy from BPA.2' In 1986-87, for example, the Canadian Entitlement
was calculated to be approximately 555 MWa, while CSPE participants
received only 418 MWa from BPA. Thus, in 1986-87, BPA essentially
received 137 MWa of "free" energy. This disparity between the calculated
Entitlement and BPA deliveries can be thought of as the price of the
"insurance" that the CSPE participants purchased from BPA to guarantee
firm power deliveries.
Determination of the downstream benefits was obviously a crucial
factor in determining the original sale price of the Canadian Entitlement.

Since the downstream benefits had to be estimated in advance for a fixed
price sale, numerous assumptions about the future growth in Pacific
Northwest electricity demand and the portfolio of resources that would
be used to meet that demand were made. Those uncertainties are still
present and could affect future negotiations of any subsequent sales.
DETERMINING THE DOWNSTREAM POWER BENEFITS

The calculation of the downstream power benefits has always been a
complex procedure, described somewhat obliquely in Annex B to the
treaty. Briefly, Annex B requires that the downstream benefits be calculated "for the sixth succeeding year,"' or about five years in advance,
based on critical streamflow periods2' and the thermal capacity of the
22. Canadian Entitlement Purchase Agreement, reprinted in Bonneville Power Administration,
supra note i,at 63.

23. The actual sale took place on September 16. 1964. As a result, the sale price was reduced
to S253,929,534.25 to reflect an equivalent present value. Letter from the Canadian Secretary for
External Affairs to W. Walton Butterworth I (September 16, 1964), reprinted in Bonneville Power
Administration, supra note I. at 36.
24. The calculation of the Entitlement is described in the next section of this paper. The difference
between BPA deliveries and the calculated Entitlement has occurred because the BPA deliveries ae
based on the original estimates of the Entitlement, while the actual magnitude of the Entitlement is
determined five years in advance.
25. See Bonneville Power Administration, supra note 1, at 21.
26. Critical streamflows are defined in Article I of the treaty as the period when "beginning with
the initial release of stored water from full reservoir conditions and ending with the reservoirs empty,
...
the water available from reservoir releases plus the natural streamflow is capable of producing
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United States power system." Under the terms of the treaty, the downstream power benefits are defined as the difference in total usable hydroelectric energy capable of being generted with and without the additional
Canadian storage, when the hydro system is operated to achieve the
maximum power benefit."' The actual benefit calculation is further complicated by the fact that, while the treaty itself called for using Canadian
storage to maximize joint power production, the Canadian Entitlement
Purchase Agreement called for operating the Canadian storage to achieve
maximum United States power production. '
Unfortunately, defining the maximum power benefit can be interpreted
differently depending on the constraints included. As Professor Swainson
notes, the Pacific Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Planning
Act of 1980" contains a mandate to create a Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Plan that requires development of a water budget designed to
"enhance the Columbia-Snake River anadromous fishery."'" The treaty
contained no such language, however. Thus, while the water budget may
reduce maximum hydroelectric output, it remains an American constraint
that will only affect the downstream benefits calculation to the extent that
Canada allows.
The calculation of the downstream power benefits is based on a three
step process. Table I contains, as an example, the calculation for the
1993-94 operating year.32 The first step of the process, referred to as Step
I in Annex B," determines a load shape (the monthly pattern of loads
reflecting seasonal demand and resource availability) for the year, based
on the planned system of generating facilities in the Pacific Northwest in
that year' This load shape is used to determine average annual total firm
loads for the Step II and Step III systems. The Step I system contains
the base United States hydroelectric and thermal resources as defined in
Annex B, 35 plus the 15.5 maf of storage supplied by the three Canadian
the least amount of hydroelectric power in mecting system load requirements. - See Bonneville Power
Administration, supra note I, at 2.
27. Thermal capacity refers to the potential power generation by thermal electric plants (such as
coal, oil, gas, and nuclear generating facilities.)
28. These terms are spelled out in Article VII(I) and Annex B(7)(8) of the treaty. See Bonneville
Power Administration, supra note 1, at 7, 22. The downstream power benefits calculations can be
found in Columbia River Treaty Operating Committee. 1993-94 Assured Operating Plan (1989)
[hereinafter AOPJ. The AOP is produced annually.
29. See Bonneville Power Administration, supra note 1, at 66.
30. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Star. 2697 (1982) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§839a-39h (1982))
[hereinafter Northwest Power Acti.
31. Swainson, supra note 2, at 253.
32. These numbers are taken from AOP, supra note 28, at 7.
33. See Bonneville Power Administration, supra note I. at 22.
34. Currently, the planned generating system used as the basis for the dowwnstream benefits
calculations is different from the actual generating system.
35. See Bonneville Power Administration. supra note I. at Ia.
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TABLE I
Computation of Canadian Entitlement for 1993-1994.
Step I!(with CanadianStorage)
Annual Firm Hydro Energy
Thermal Displacement Energy
Other Usable Secondary Energy
System Annual Avg. Usable Energy

8.970.2
1,148.2
492.8
10,611.2

MWa
MWa
MWa
MWa

Step I!X(without CanadianStorage)
Annual Firm Hydro Energy
Thermal Displacement Energy
Other Usable Secondary Energy
System Annual Avg. Usable Energy

6,485.2
1,783.1
1,031.4
9,299.7

MWa
MWa
MWa
MWa

Average Annual Usable Energy Gain'

1,311.5 MWa

Canadian Share of Avg. Annual Energy Gain'

655.7 MWa

a. Difference between Step If and Step II System
Annual Avg. Usable Energy.
b. One-half of average annual usable energy gain.
Source: AOP (1989).

projects. The Step [II system is the United States base system without
the additional Canadian storage.' The additional hydroelectric energy
produced with the Canadian Storage, called the average annual usable
energy gain, defines the downstream benefits.37
Three components determine this additional hydroelectric energy. First,
average thermal firm energy is subtracted from average total firm energy.
The remaining firm hydroelectric energy with and without Canadian storage is the first component. In Table 1, the remaining firm hydroelectric
energy equals 8,970 MWa with Canadian storage, and only 6,485 MWa
without Canadian storage.
The second component of the additional hydroelectric energy is referred
to as thermal displacement energy. Thermal displacement energy can be
thought of as thermal generation that is replaced with secondary, or non36. The United States base system generation is based, in part, on the requirements of the 1964
Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement, which was developed in conjunction with the treaty.
The Coordination Agreement was signed by fourteen Northwest utilities, BPA. and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers to coordinate seasonal hydro operations, and thus guarantee that United States
hydropower production is optimized. The agreement expires June 30, 2003, three months after the
Entitlement is scheduled to be completely repatriated to British Columbia. See J.Joliffe, The Pacific
Northwest Coordination Agreement. Conference Paper from Bonneville Power Administration to
The Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, New York. December 1964. (A copy of the
Coordination Agreement itself may be obtained from BPA.)
37. For simplicity, the determination of the downstream peaking capacity benefits, which remains
controversial, will be ignored in this paper.
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firm hydroelectric energy. 8 The amount of thermal displacement energy
equals the amount of available secondary energy up to the level of potential thermal displacement energy. Potential thermal displacement energy is generally less than total thermal generation due, in part, to takeor-pay contracts with coal suppliers. These contracts require payment for
coal regardless of whether that coal is used to generate electricity. As a
result, some minimum level of thermal generation cannot be economically
displaced. Thus, potential thermal displacement equals the difference
between average thermal firm loads and this minimum level of thermal
generation. In Table 1, thermal displacement energy with Canadian storage equals 1,148 MWa.- Without Canadian storage, there is more nonfirm hydroelectric energy. As a result, 1,783 MWa of thermal energy can
be displaced in the Step III system.
The third and final component of the available hydroelectric energy is
the remaining usable secondary energy, equal to 40 percent of the total
remaining secondary energy after subtraction of thermal replacement energy. In the Step II system, total secondary energy is 2,380 MWa. Subtracting off the 1,148 MWa of thermal replacement energy leaves 1,232
MWa of remaining secondary energy. Forty percent of that remaining
secondary energy, 493 MWa, equals other usable secondary energy. Similarly, in the Step III system, subtracting off 1,922 MWa of thermal
replacement energy leaves 2,572 MWa of remaining secondary energy
and, hence, 1,032 MWa of other secondary energy. The 40 percent figure
was the subject of intense negotiations by the two countries. Because the
Canadians feared that completion of a Pacific Northwest-Southwest intertie would diminish the value of the treaty storage projects, they wanted
none of the remaining secondary energy to be classified as usable. In that
way, the difference between the Step 11 and Step III calculations of usable
energy would be increased, as would the Entitlement. In contrast, the
United States sought to declare 100 percent of the remaining secondary
energy usable, in order to minimize the Entitlement.' ° The two countries
agreed to set the level at 40 percent.
The three components of available hydroelectric energy-remaining
firm hydroelectric energy, thermal displacement energy, and remaining
usable secondary energy-are determined for both the Step 11 and Step
38. Secondary, or non-firm hydroelectric energy is the amount of energy generated in excess of
firm load carrying capability. Thus, in a year where snowpack is greater than normal and storage
levels are high, there will be more secondary energy available than under sustained drought conditions. See supra note 14.
39. For the 1992-93 AOP, total thermal resources equal 5812 MWa. Minimum thermal generation
equals 1885 Mwa. leaving 3927 MWa of potential thermal displacement. With the available Canadian
storage, the expected amount of secondary hydro energy will be able to displace 1327 MWa. roughly
one-third of the potential thermal displacement.
40. See J. Krutilla. supra nte 7, at 137-41.
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Figure 1
The Canadian Entitlement

1989
1984
Operating Year

Original Forecast

Actual

2003
M Current Forecast

III systems. The difference, over 1,300 MWa for the 1993-94 operating
year. equals the calculated downstream benefits. One half of that total,
about 650 MWa, equals the Canadian Entitlement.
The original estimates of the Entitlement have generally been much
smaller than its actual magnitude. 4 ' Figure Ishows this difference through
operating year 1994, and the difference between the original and current
forecasts for operating years 1995-2003. The rapid decline of the Entitlement that was originally forecast did not occur. As a result, by 2003,
the Entitlement may be three times larger than had been predicted in
1964.
The discrepancy between the original forecasts of the downstream
benefits and the current estimates are largely the result of much lower
than anticipated growth in electricity demand in the Pacific Northwest.
The discrepancy in the magnitude of the downstream benefits is cited as
one reason for more recent Canadian criticism of the original sale.' Some
Canadians argue that, due to the discrepancy between actual and anticipated benefits, the original sale was a "bad" deal for Canada, although
Professor Swainson notes that the discrepancy is "a reflection of the
41. See Departments of External Affairs and Northern Affairs and Natural Resources. The Columbia River Treaty and Protocol: A Presentation 99 (April 1964).
42. Swainson, supra note 2,at 255.
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recognized risk of a prepaid sale."' 3 He also concludes that, if another
sale were to occur, "[Biritish Columbia would be very unlikely to accept
any agreement which did not contain provision for periodic adjustments
in the price .... "
At this time, it is not known what the final magnitude of the downstream
power benefits and, hence, the Entitlement, will be when the original
sale expires in 2003. Current estimates are approximately 600 MWa of
energy, and 1,400 MW of peak capacity.' 5 Pacific Northwest load growth
in the next decade, and the resources used to meet that load growth, will
determine the final magnitude.
Due to the language of Annex B of the treaty, the larger the proportion
of Pacific Northwest loads served by thermal resources, the smaller will
be the magnitude of the downstream power benefits, since additional
thermal resources can essentially perform the same "firming" function
as hydro storage. According to calculations by the Bonneville Power
Administration, each additional 300 MWa of thermal resources would
reduce the Canadian share of the downstream benefits by approximately
10 MWa. 4 The magnitude of the downstream benefits is a critical factor
in determining the value of a future sale. Estimates of the value of such
a sale are the subject of the next section.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 256. The Canadian criticism is. however, not uniform. For example, a recent analysis
by B.C. Hydro concluded that. despite the disparity between the originally estimated and actual
downstream power benefits, the sale of the downstream benefits was a "sound economic decision."
B.C. Hydro, Dept. of Corporate Affairs, Benefit Cost Analysis of the Sale of the Columbia River
Downstream Benefits 7 (1988).
45. Telephone interview with Mr. Merrill Schultz, President, Merrill ,Schultz and Associates
(March 6, 1989). Originally, it was estimated that at the completion of the sale the Canadian
Entitlement would only be about 200 MWa. while the capacity benefits would be less than 400 MW.
The magnitude of the power owed to Canada should slowly decline after 2003. Two recently signed
agreements. Columbia River Treaty Entity Agreement on Principles forThe Preparation of the Assured
Operating Plan and Determination of Downstream Power Benefit Studies. July 28. 1988. and Columbia River Treaty Entity Agreement on Changes to Procedures for Preparation of the Assured
Operating Plan and Determination of Downstream Benefit Power Benefit Studies. August 12, 1988.
have modified the calculation of the downstream power benefits. The net result of these modifications
is an increase in the magnitude of the benefits. For example, the 1992-93 AOP would have originally
calculated the Canadian share of the downstream power benefits to be 572.5 MWa. Under the revised
calculations, those benefits have increased to 593.7 MWa. (Copies of these agreements are available
from BPA.)
46. Telephone interview with Mr. John Hyde, Bonneville Power Administration (October 14,
1987). See also J. Krutilla, supra note 7, at 32ff. This raises an interesting strategic question of
whether British Columbia should seek to market additional non-treaty power to the Pacific Northwest
to reduce the incentive to build new thermal resources, and therefore increase the magnitude (and
value) of the Entitlement. Towards the goal of marketing additional power to the United States, in
1988 B.C. Hydro formed an unregulated subsidiary. POWEREX, Ltd., to negotiate sales of surplus
power to the United States. POWEREX is also negotiating with several utilities in the Pacific
Northwest for the construction of additional trans-border transmission facilities. Unfortunately, consideration of strategic decisions for B.C. Hydro is beyond the scope of this article.
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ESTIMATING THE VALUE OF A FUTURE DOWNSTREAM
BENEFITS SALE
A complete benefit-cost analysis of the downstream power benefits
would evaluate alternative markets for the power and account for the
value of alternative consumptive uses of the Columbia River, such as fish
and wildlife enhancement and irrigation for agricultural production. Unless Canada agrees to major changes in the calculation of the benefits,
however, the major determinant of the value of the Entitlement is the
potential reduction in power production costs the Entitlement could provide to the Pacific Northwest. This framework is consistent with IJC
Power Principle No. 5, which stated that the value of the downstream
benefits would be based on an opportunity cost framework.' 7 Unfortunately, such a complete benefit-cost analysis would be extremely complex.
Estimating the value of alternative uses of the Columbia River would
require non-market valuation techniques.' Estimating the value of the
Entitlement to markets outside the Pacific Northwest would require estimates of future supply and demand curves in those markets. Defining
these outside markets is difficult, however, and will depend on the structure of future electricity transmission arrangements and capacity.' 9
The current analysis, therefore, is more limited in scope and is performed only from a Pacific Northwest perspective. It assumes that, irrespective of a future Entitlement gale, other uses of the Columbia River
will remain constant. Thus, the reduction in power production costs in
the Northwest due to a future Entitlement sale forms the basis for the
current analysis. Finally, the analysis focuses only on the energy benefits
of the Entitlement. Evaluations of the capacity benefits are not included
since those benefits could vary greatly depending on the system operating
characteristics of a future purchaser.
Resale of the Entitlement to the Pacific Northwest would delay the
need for new generating facilities. All other things equal, the longer the
duration of a resale, the greater the value of the Entitlement would be to
the Northwest. To determine the reduction in power production costs and
increase in secondary energy revenues that would accompany an Entitlement sale, the analysis estimates the difference between power production
costs in the Pacific Northwest assuming the Entitlement is repatriated
47. Protocol, supra note 8, at 49.
48. Non-market techniques to value resources are often based on the results of surveys that
correlate behavioral aspects into dollar values. For an example of such a study applied to migratory
waterfowl, see Brown & Hammack. A Preliminary Investigation of the Economics of Migratory
Waterfowl, in Natural Environments: Studies in Theoretical and Applied Analysis 171 (J. Knitilla
ed. 1972).
49. See e.g., United States Office of Technology Assessment, Electric Power Wheeling and
Dealing: Technological Considerations for Increasing Competition (1989).
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completely by 2003, as is now scheduled,-' and under the assumption
that repatriation of the Entitlement is delayed between 10 and 30 years
at zero cost. The difference in total power production costs in the Pacific
Northwest between these two cases can provide one estimate of the value
of the Entitlement.-"
These limitations notwithstanding, the magnitude of the Entitlement
and its value to the Pacific Northwest, will depend on future electric
demand and the portfolio of resources available to serve that demand. At
this time those factors are uncertain, complicating estimation of the potential reduction in power production costs due to any future sale of the
Entitlement. To deal with this uncertainty, a Monte-Carlo simulation
model that can directly account for both demand and supply uncertainty
is used. This model, called the Integrated Systems for the Analysis of
Acquisitions (ISAAC), has been developed jointly by the Northwest Power
Planning Council (a federal-state compact commission created in 1981
by the Northwest Power Act) 2 and BPA.
ISAAC simulates the effects of alternative resource decisions by forecasting loads, operating the power system in the Pacific Northwest, and
then determining total system costs, resultant electric rates, and net economic benefits." In simulating the effects of alternative resource decisions, the model incorporates uncertainty through several variables, including
loads, resource costs and scheduling, and water conditions.' ISAAC
50. The repatriation schedule is spelled out in the Canadian Entitlement Purchase Agreement.
See Bonneville Power Administration, supra note 1, at 64.
5 I. At first glance, assuming that repatriation of the Entitlement is delayed at zero cost may be
confusing. Consider, however, an indirect utility framework, and recall that the compensating variation may be implicitly defined such that V(M, P)--V(M -CV, P), where V is the indirect utility
function. (See R. Just, Applied Welfare Economics and Public Policy 414 (1982), for a further
discussion.) Let M = income, Po = the initial price of electricity assuming the Entitlement is repatriated
as scheduled, P, = the price of electricity assuming that repatriation is delayed, and CV = the compensating variation. There will exist a dollar amount that can be paid for the Entitlement such that
the overall price for electricity with the Entitlement and the overall price of electricity without the
Entitlement are equal. For this dollar amount, P0 = Pt, and CV--0. Thus, willingness-to-pay for the
Entitlement at this dollar amount (that is, the Pacific Northwest's willingness-to-pay) will be zero.
Similarly, if repatriation of the Entitlement is delayed for "free," then Po>P, and CV>O. For this
modeling exercise, the difference between total Pacific Northwest power production costs when the
Entitlement is repatriated as scheduled and when repatriation is delayed at zero cost is used as a
proxy for CV.
52. See supra note 30.
53. It is important to note that ISAAC is not an optimization model. That is, ISAAC is not
designed to choose an optimal portfolio of resources in the absence of any user defined resource
acquisition rules. For example, ISAAC selects conservation resources first because conservation is
given priority by the Northwest Power Act. There have been previous attempts to design resource
optimization models for the Northwest. None of these models have performed adequately, however.
54. ISAAC uses the range of load forecasts developed by the Northwest Power Planning Council
and that agency's estimates of resource costs. The interested reader is referred to Northwest Power
Planning Council, Forecasts of Electricity Loads in the Pacific Northwest (November 1988) and
Northwest Power Planning Council, Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plain (1986).
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cycles through the entire modeling period on an annual basis, and cumulates the results. For each year of the modeling period, a load forecast
is calculated, the power system is operated, costs and rates are calculated,
and resources are acquired if necessary. Each pass through the entire
modeling period constitutes one game of the Monte-Carlo simulation.
Each game uses a new random selection of the variables subject to uncertainty. Generally, 100 games are run to generate sufficiently robust
probability distributions of outcomes."5 For each game, the difference in
power production costs (hence revenue requirements) with the current
repatriation schedule and with delayed repatriation is determined. This
defines a probability distribution for the net present value of the Entitlement, from which an expected net present value can be determined.'
To estimate the value of the downstream benefits, a benchmark probability distribution of the present value of revenue requirements must first
be computed. For this case, which will be called the "status quo," ISAAC
is run with the Entitlement being completely repatriated as scheduled.
The modeling period used is 1988-2040. This modeling period is used

in order to fully compare the differences in power production costs between the status quo and the delayed repatriation cases." After the status
quo case is completed, the model is run under the assumption that repatriation of the Entitlement is delayed between 10 and 30 years. Assessing the value of the Entitlement in this manner focuses on the opportunity
cost of the Entitlement from a Pacific Northwest perspective.
Table 2 summarizes the net present value of the overall expected revenue requirements to operate the Pacific Northwest power system for both
the status quo and the alternative delayed repatriation cases. The first
column shows the present value of total expected revenue requirements
associated with operating the Pacific Northwest's power system. The
second column shows the reduction in expected revenue requirements
between the status quo and each of the alternative delayed repatriation
55. Because ISAAC is a new model, there are no formal publications that detail its operation.
Documentation of a previous simulation model, known as the Decision Model, upon which ISAAC
is partially based, is contained in Bonneville Power Administration. Draft Resource Analysis Documentation--1987 Resource Strategy I (1986). (Working notes concerning ISAAC are also available
from the author.)
56. In actuality, the difference in total revenue requirements defines a Laspeyres measure of
welfare change, measured from the initial level of consumption. More information on the Laspeyres
measure can be found in P. Layard & A. Walters, Microeconomic Theory 157 (1978). This measure
will slightly underestimate the compensating variation measure of welfare change. Cf. Willig, Consumers' Surplus without Apology, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 589 (1976).
57. For example, a 30 year delay in repatriation will postpone return of the Entitlement to 2033.
If the modeling period only extended to the year 2020. the reduction in power production costs from
2021-2033 would not be accounted for. The analysis also assumes that the treaty will not be terminated
on its expiration date of 2024. This is consistent with the language in the treaty which, in Article
XIX, states that it will be automatically renewed unless one side specifically calls for termination
on ten years prior notice.
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TABLE 2
Net Present Value of Canadian Share of Downstream Energy Benefits*
(Billions of 1988 Dollars)
Total
Expected Revenue Reqts.
to Operate Power System
Status Quo

32.79

30
25
20
15
10

31.09
31.35
31,61
31,92
32.25

Year Delay
Year Delay
Year Delay
Year Delay
Year Delay

Expected
Reduction in Revenue
Reqts. with Entitlement

1.70
1.44
1.18
0.88
0.54

*Discounted at a 3.0 percent real rate of interest.

cases. As the table shows, if the Pacific Northwest was able to retain the
Entitlement for 30 years to help meet the demand for electricity, expected
revenue requirements would be reduced by about $1.7 billion (1988
dollars) in 1988.8 Retaining the Entitlement for shorter periods of time
would reduce overall expected revenue requirements proportionally less.
Even so, significant potential benefits to the Pacific Northwest could
result. A ten year delay in repatriation, for example, would have an
expected value of over one-half billion dollars.
Because the actual choice of discount rate used would be the subject
of negotiation just as it was in the original sale," a sensitivity analysis
was performed using a six percent real discount rate. All other things
equal, Canadian negotiators would argue for a lower discount rate to raise
the current dollar value of the Entitlement, while United States negotiators
would argue for a higher rate to lower the current dollar value. Reporting
the results for both three and six percent real rates is done to bracket the
potential value of the Entitlement for a discount rate that might be used.
Table 3 presents the same status quo and delayed repatriation cases
using the higher real discount rate. Total revenue requirements decline,
as do the decreases in total expected revenue requirements when the
Entitlement is retained by the Pacific Northwest.
58. Because a resale of the Entitlement would not begin until 1998 at the earliest, the present
value of the reduction in costs in 1998 (using 1988 dollars) would be larger than the present value
in 1988. Using a 3 percent real discount rate. this difference would be approximately one-third.
Thus. for example, the thirty year delayed repatriation case would have an expected reduction in
costs of $2.28 billion (1988 dollars) in 1998.
59. The original sale specified that a nominal discount rate of four and one-half percent would
be used. This rate reflected the estimated long term opportunity cost of capital. See Rrotocol. supra
note 8. at 174.
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TABLE 3
Net Present Value of Canadian Share of Downstream Energy Benefits*
(Billions of 1988 Dollars)
Total
Expected Revenue Reqts,
to Operate Power System

Expected
Reduction inRevenue
Reqts. with Entitlement

15.99

Status Quo

15.14
30 Year Delay
15.22
25 Year Delay
15.31
20 Year Delay
15.43
15 Year Delay
15.60
10 Year Delay
*Discounted at a 6.0 percent real rate of interest.

0.85
0.77
0.68
0.56
0.39

The results of this study indicate that the potential value of a future
resale of the Entitlement may be worth several billion dollars. However,
in addition to monetary values, there are also significant policy issues
that must be resolved. These issues, and their implications are the subject
of the next section.
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 reflect several key assumptions
in terms of optimal long-term energy policies and strategies. It was assumed that the Entitlement would be resold to the Pacific Northwest. It
was also assumed that future load growth in the Pacific Northwest would
eventually be met with new thermal generating resources, especially coalfired power plants, thereby reducing the magnitude of the calculated
Entitlement. Finally, the existing agreements that regulate the coordination of hydro power production in the Pacific Northwest were assumed
to continue beyond their current 2003 expiration date.' If these assumptions do not hold in the future, and they need not, the value of the
Entitlement could change significantly. Greater access to transmission
facilities, a changing regulatory structure, renewed concerns over environmental costs of electrical generation, and potential changes to coordinated United States hydropower operations may have significant impacts
on the magnitude and value of the Entitlement.
When the original sale took place, the ability to transmit large amounts
of power from the Pacific Northwest to the Pacific Southwest did not
exist. Completion of the intertie linking the two regions did not occur
60.

. Joliffe, supra note 36, at I.
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until 1968, though its construction was linked with passage of the Regional Preference Ac' and the value of Treaty storage. 2 The current
capacity of the intertie is scheduled to be expanded from 5,200 MW to
about 7,900 MW in 1992.63 That expansion, coupled with declining electricity surpluses in the Pacific Northwest and prospects for additional
deregulation of electric power supply industries," could make it easier
for British Columbia to sell the Canadian Entitlement outside of the Pacific
Northwest,' and at a significantly higher price.
The shrinking electricity surplus in the Northwest may reduce firm
power sales to the Southwest.' Coupled with the recently ratified CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement,67 B.C. Hydro could create new
opportunities to market the Entitlement to the Southwest, where the demand for power has been growing rapidly. Furthermore, if both Pacific
Northwest and Pacific Southwest states switch over to competitive bidding
systems for new electric supplies, B.C. Hydro or its subsidiary POWEREX could, in principle, offer the Entitlement as a bid resource." One
consequence of such a system could be the melding of all or part of the
Entitlement with other resources that may be developed in British Columbia for export sale. This could result in a much higher price for a
hybrid resource with more desirable characteristics, such as availability
tailored to the needs of the purchasers and a well-defined magnitude.
However, alternative types of sales might create additional institutional
difficulties.
If the Entitlement were sold to one or more Pacific Southwest utilities,
there could also be difficulties with physically transmitting the power.
The current BPA Intertie Access Policy imposes restrictions on access to
61. Pub. L. No. 88-552, 78 Stat. 757 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§.837(a)-(h) (1988)).
A discussion of this act and its economic consequences is contained in Lesser. The Economics of
Preference Power, 12 Res. L. & Econ. 131 (1989).
62. J. Krutilla, supra note 7, at 169. concluded that the intertie would decrease the value of the
Entitlement, since the intertie could effectively substitute for the additional Canadian storage. While
this was probably true at the time of the original sale, it may no longer hold. Increased intertie
capacity may increase the ability for British Columbia to market the Entitlement to the Pacific
Southwest, where the demand for power and the value of power is growing rapidly.
63. Bonneville Power Administration, The Third AC Interie: Breaking the Bottleneck at the
Border. Issue Alert. September 1988.
64. See e.g., Griggs, Competitive Bidding and Independent Power Producers:Is Deregulation
Coming to the Electric Utility Industry?, 9 Energy L.J. 415 (1988).
65. The Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States also eases intertie access
restrictions on B.C. Hydro. Canada-United States Free.Trade Agreement, Annex 905.2, H.R. Doc.
No. 216, 100 Cong., 2nd Sess. 297 (1988).
66. Northwest Power Planning Council, Supplement to the 1986 Northwest Conservation and
Electric Power Plan 5-4 (1989).
67. Department of External Affairs. The Canada/United States Free Trade Agreement, (December
10, 1987).
68. A description of competitive bidding and its implications on electric utility planning may be
found in Griggs, supra note 64, at 439-42.
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the intertie. ' But, if a sale were arranged, BPA might be pressured to
alter its intertie access policy so that the Entitlement could be more easily
delivered to the Southwest. Even with expanded intertie capacity, this
could reduce BPA revenues from secondary energy sales to the Southwest,
and thereby increase the costs to the Pacific Northwest from repatriating
the'Entitlement. Sales to individual Northwest utilities would also require
additional trans-border transmission capacity and might require interutility arrangements for transmission access.
The Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement may also become a
negotiating factor, especially if physical repatriation of the Entitlement
is required.7' The agreement expires June 30, 2003, three months after
the Canadian Entitlement is scheduled to completely revert back to B.C.
Hydro. Significant impacts on return or resale of the Entitlement may
result from not having a new coordination agreement, or having one that
is substantially different from the current agreement.
While specific shares of the Entitlement were allocated to each of the
41 CSPE participants, no allocation procedures currently exist for power
that must be returned to Canada. 7 Coupled with the expiration of the
Pacific Northwest Coordination Agreement, the 41 CSPE participants
could find themselves embroiled in protracted litigation to assign responsibility for the return of the Entitlement. Without an agreement, it
is not clear whether the individual parties, most importantly the Army
Corps of Engineers, would continue to operate the hydropower system
in a manner consistent with previous maximization of the downstream
benefits. In the meantime, though, the United States would still be required to abide by the provisions of the treaty. Presumably, the Bonneville
Power Administration would be required to provide the necessary power
to British Columbia, and then negotiate with the CSPE participants for
the appropriate energy payments.
Physical repatriation might also interfere with the transfer of the Entitlement to other United States purchasers, other export sales of power
by British Columbia, or domestic use of the Entitlement due to scheduling
requirements and existing capacity limitations on the interconnections
between B.C. Hydro and BPA. 2 This could reduce the amount of the
69. Bonneville Power Administration. Long Term Intertie Access Policy (May 17, 1988).
70. See supra note 36.
71. A set of coordination principles had been proposed that included treatment of obligations
under the treaty. However, these principles did not appear in the actual Pacific Northwest Coordination
Agreement. See, Memorandum from Charles Luce to Stewart Udal (March 2, 1961) (Suggesting
Proposed Principles of Coordination). Iam grateful to Mr. Merrill Schultz for bringing this point
to my attention.
72. Currently, BPA does not possess the transmission capacity that would be needed to deliver
the Entitlement to the transfer point at Oliver, British Columbia, as specified in Article V of the
treaty. See Bonneville Power Administration, supra note I, at 5.
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available downstream benefits to the detriment of British Columbia, and
possibly harm political relations between the United States and Canada.
Renewed concerns over the environmental impacts of thermal generating plants may also come into play in future negotiations of an Entitlement sale. Continuing concern over acid rain and global warming from
the "greenhouse" effect might reduce the likelihood that new thermal
resources will be constructed in the Pacific Northwest, leading to a larger
than expected magnitude for the Entitlement. At the same time, these
environmental concerns could increase the value (on a per megawatt-hour
basis) of the Entitlement, due to the higher opportunity costs that would
be associated with thermal resources, and provide British Columbia with
serendipitous gains from a future sale. With its large potential for additional hydropower development, British Columbia could conceivably
package the Entitlement with other hydro resources for sale to the highest
bidder.
Finally, the requirements for fish and wildlife mitigation may prove
important in future negotiations. BPA must follow the requirements of
the Northwest Power Act to "protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and
wildlife," requiring that a certain amount of stream flows in the Columbia
River (called the water budget) be used for fish and wildlife purposes.
British Columbia is not subject to this environmental constraint, however,
as the treaty did not contain any provisions for fish and wildlife protection." Thus, BPA and the CSPE participants could find themselves constrained by their obligations to British Columbia, and the requirements
of the Northwest Power Act.
With billions of dollars worth of electricity potentially at stake, as well
is international relations between two longstanding trade partners, both
countries would be well advised to begin seriously considering the issues
surrounding the Entitlement in the near future. Whether or not the Pacific
Northwest repurchases the Entitlement, the impacts of other contractual
arrangements and the changes in electricity markets will affect all of the
parties involved.' As Professor Swainson concludes, both countries should
examine "The strategies which ... the two countries might utilize to
acquire the greatest possible insight concerning. . . the consequences of
acts of cooperative and non-cooperative behavior. . . ."" Renegotiation
73. This point is disputed by the non-federal utilities which have generating facilities on the
Columbia River. They argue that, without the treaty storage, no water budget would be required,
since flows would be large enough to accommodate anadromous fish requirements. Telephone interview with Mr. Merrill Schultz, supra note 45.
74. Subsequent to the analysis presented in this paper, the British Columbia Minister of Energy
issued a statement indicating that British Columbia would not negotiate a resale of the Entitlement.
but would instead use the Entitlement to meet future domestic electricity requirements. See J. Davis,
News Release 1990:01 (January 15, 1990).

75. Swainson, supra note 2, at 259.
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of a sale of the Entitlement, if it occurs, will be an arduous task, yet will
address only one facet of the treaty. Whether such a renegotiation takes
both countries "from here to there" will depend on the mutual interests
they share about the Columbia River system, and elsewhere.

